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Abstract: Software-Defined Networking (SDN) introduces granularity, visibility and flexibility to 
networking, which separates the control-logic from networking devices. SDN programmatically modifies the 
functionality and behaviour of network devices. It separates control plane and data plane, and thus provides 
centralized control. Though SDN provides better performance but there are some security issues that need to 
be taken care of. This includes firewalls, monitoring applications, IDS(Intrusion detection systems) etc. 
Therefore, this research work reviews the related approaches which have been proposed by identifying their 
firewall scope, their practicability, their advantages and drawbacks related with SDN. This paper describes 
the firewall policies as the forth new security challenges. 
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1. Introduction 
Network Security is an important issue of today‘s 
Networking. Recently, Software Defined Networking is an 
evolving technology that decouples the Control from 
forwarding network devices like switches, routers, hubs etc. 
SDN splits data plane and control plane . It controls the flow 
of data through  high level program. Since in SDN network 
control is done programmatically network security is more 
vital task .This paper reviews how SDN can play a major 
role in implementing the network security functions mainly 
Firewall policies.  
 
2. Openflow 
OpenFlow has been introduced in [19] is tends to be the de 
facto standard for SDN. This is developed by the Open 
Networking Foundation.. With OpenFlow, every switch 
communicates to a controller in order to install, delete or 
modify flow-based rules to process incoming packets. 
Examples of controllers are NOX, POX  or Floodlight etc. 
Installing a rule creates an entry in the switch flow table. 
Each entry is composed of two main components, match 
fields and Instructions fields. Match fields is a filter to match 
packet headers like Ethernet addresses, TCP ports, IP 
addresses, Time-to- Live value .Instructions field is a 
definition on how to handle an incoming packet by matching 
the rule and  it is composed of a set of actions to send the 
packet towards a single or multiple ports, to drop or to apply 
some header modifications . In addition, the flows entries 
maintain counters indicating number of matched packets, 
number of bytes, number of errors. 
 
3. Firewalls  
Firewalls are essential components in a network that act as a 
first level of access control. It protects the local network 
from other hosts in Internet, which are not trustworthy. 
Packet filtering can be done at the different levels of the 
network layer. Most of the packet filtering  are analyze 
packet headers up to the transport layer but there also exist 
application level firewalls. There are very few switches now 
supporting layer 7. 
As a conclusion, achieving traffic  filtering above layer 4 can 
be enabled by OpenFlow by inspecting the packets at the 
controller side assuming that all incoming packets are 
forwarded to it with Packet In messages. So traffic filtering 
clearly increases the latency and thus only viable by limiting 
the analysis to a few packets.On the other hand, the 
inspection on highest layers in switches is also contradictory 
with the SDN paradigm which aims at keeping switches as 
forwarding devices only because other processes are 
resource consuming. 
Firewall may be Stateless firewall or statefull firewall. 
 
4. Stateless firewall 
 A stateless firewall filters the packets based on the values in 
the headers like the IP address or the port numbers and 
decide to accept or drop. It does not check the status of a 
connection to check the legitimacy of a packet. 
 
5. Stateful firewall 
In case of a TCP-based stateful firewall, only incoming 
packets part of a flow which has been initiated by a machine 
of the local network are usually allowed. 
 
6. Literature reviews 
One of the fundamental challenges of SDN is to build robust 
firewalls for protecting OpenFlow-based networks where 
network states and traffic are frequently changed. An 
example of SDN firewall application has been introduced in 
Floodlight [1] where each packet-in behavior triggered by 
the first packet of a traffic flow which is matched against a 
set of existing firewall rules that allow or deny a flow at its 
ingress switch. This preliminary implementation of 
OpenFlow-based firewall application can only examine flow 
packet violations when new flows come in the network but it 
cannot check flow policy violations with respect to dynamic 
network policy updates. 
To build robust firewall, Alaauddin Shieha introduce 
FLOWGUARD [2], is a comprehensive framework, to 
facilitate  accurate detection as well as effective resolution of 
firewall policy violations in dynamic OpenFlow-based 
networks.when network states are updated, FLOWGUARD 
checks network flow path spaces to detect firewall policy 
violations. In addition, with the help of several innovative 
resolution strategies designed ,it conducts automatic and 
real-time violation resolutions for diverse network update 
situations. ALAAUDDIN SHIEHA   also implement his 
framework and demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed 
detection and resolution approaches in FLOWGUARD 
through experiments with the help of a real-world network 
topology. 
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In [3], an earlier solution for building a security enhanced 
firewall application was introduced  where it only focuses on 
addressing bypass threats in OpenFlow-based networks. In 
contrast, FLOW- GUARD is a comprehensive framework for 
building robust SDN firewalls to enable both accurate 
detection and  resolution of various firewall policy violations 
in dynamic OpenFlow-based networks. 
In the Frenetic Project [4], a higher-level language know as 
Pyretic [4] was recently introduced to allows SDN 
programmers to write modular network applications. By 
compiling conflicting policies into a prioritized rule set, 
Pyretic‘s sequential composition operator could potentially 
resolve direct policy conflicts. However, it cannot discover 
and resolve indirect security violations caused by dynamic 
packet modifications without a flow tracking mechanism [4]. 
FortNOX [5] was proposed as a software extension  to 
provide security constraint enforcement for OpenFlow 
controllers. It can identify indirect security violations. 
However, They can not directly adopt FortNOX approach to 
design SDN firewalls due to several reasons. One of the 
reason is that the rule conflict analysis algorithm provided by 
FortNOX records rule relations in alias sets, which are 
unable to accurately track network traffic flows. In particular, 
the conflict detection algorithm in FortNOX only conducts 
pairwise conflict analysis between new flow rules and each 
single security constraint without considering rule 
dependencies within flow tables [6] and among security 
constraints [6]. The second reason is, when FortNOX detects 
a security violation caused by new rules installed by a non-
security application, it simply rejects the rules without 
offering a fine grained violation resolution. 
A couple of verification tools [7, 8,  9] for checking network 
invariants and policy correctness in OpenFlow networks 
have been already proposed. Mainly, VeriFlow [7] and 
NetPlumber [7] are capable of checking the compliance of 
network updates with specified invariants in real time. Even 
though these tools can be potentially used to detect firewall 
policy violations, they could not support automatic and 
effective violation resolution.  They also ignore rule 
dependencies within security constraints, such as firewall 
policies, for compliance checking. In addition, they are also 
unable to check stateful network properties [10]. 
There are number of firewall algorithms and tools have been 
designed to assist system administrators to managing and 
analyzing firewall policy anomalies [6]. Yuan et al. [6] 
presented, a toolkit known as FIRE- MAN to check for 
misconfigurations in firewall policies through static analysis. 
In [11, 12] introduced FAME, a visualization-based firewall 
anomaly management environment, to detect and resolve of 
firewall anomalies. However, existing firewall policy 
analysis tools can only detect policy anomalies within a 
firewall policy, but cannot be directly applied to deal with 
firewall policy violations against flow entries  in dynamic 
Open- Flow networks enviroment with respect to network-
wide access control. 
In [14],an overview of machine learning techniques for 
anomaly detection proposed. Their experiments 
demonstrated that the supervised learning methods 
significantly outperform the unsupervised ones if the test 
data contains no unknown attacks. The best performance is 
achieved by the non-linear methods, such as SVM, multi-
layer perceptron among the supervised methods and the rule-
based methods. Techniques for unsupervised  such as K-
Means, SOM, and one class SVM achieved better 
performance  over the other techniques although they differ  
in their capabilities  of detecting all attacks classes efficient. 
In [20] they shown the various categories of security threats 
associated with SDN layered framework defined in SDN 
architecture. They defines different security attacks like Data 
leakage i.e. spoofing, unauthorized access, denial-of-service,  
data modification, malicious applications etc. that are 
possible at different parts of SDN framework. 
SDN Scanner [21] acieve the network header field change 
scanning, it scans networks as changing header fields and 
then records the response time of each packet. After that it 
compares the response time and use statistical tests.It is 
possible to conduct resource consumption attack on SDN 
with almost  85.7% accuracy with the fingerprinting results 
of SDN. So new defence solutions we need to be designed to 
overcome such threats.  
AvantGuard [22] proposed new architecture as data plane 
extensions to protect network from control plane saturation 
attack that disrupts network operations. It introduces 
connection migration by actuating triggers over the data 
plane‘s existing statistics collection services. AvantGuard  
provides both detection of, and responses to, the changing 
flow dynamics within the data plane.The Connection 
migration enables the data plane to protect the control plane 
from  saturation attacks. 
AMQ [23] proposed a technique to detecting and isolating 
insecure network devices in Data centres, before they effect 
negatively to the network. After discovering a potential 
threat, it automatically identifies the problem and download 
the patches necessary to resolve it. AMQ automatically 
allows the device to re-join the network on resolution. In 
AMQ,there are two primary security network service 
modules (NSM) hosted on the controller. First one is a 
Botunter monitor the network and detect a malware infected 
host in real time. Secondly one is a threat responder NSM 
that directs the controller to initiate the quarantine procedure 
to isolate the threat.The Web Proxy notifier is activated to 
inform the user on the infected host that security has been 
compromised,when a host is quarantined. It can be used for 
moderate speed links only.  
In [24], the authors propose a language to define firewall 
rules relying on the POX controller. The rules are installed in 
a reactive way. The evaluation shows that the implemented 
functionalities work, allowing or blocking traffic, but does 
not assess any performance metric, for instance about 
underlying introduced delays. 
There are Several other recent efforts have been introduced 
to address various security challenges, such as vulnerability 
assessment [13], DDoS attack detection [15], and saturation 
attack mitigation [10], scanning attack prevention [7],  in 
SDNs. 
 
7. Conclusions  
 SDN become a very efficient technology which is going to 
be the future of networking.SDN provides flexibility by 
programming the control, including the centralized control, 
which helps in handling the whole network. It becomes more 
beneficial in case of synchronization, controlling, providing 
scalability and management of data in large data centres. 
Also the Abstraction and Virtualization of resources helps in 
securing the network and hiding complexity. In SDN there 
are still different areas which are required to be taken care of, 
like securing the SDN control plane since  as whole control 
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of SDN is centralized in control plane; hence security of 
Control plane is very important and prevention from several 
attacks is main area of concern at present.The openness of 
SDN system allows  to write control programs so it is 
essential to design some protocols or use existing protocols 
efficiently that will check the correctness of programming 
logic before implementation of SDN .Also the Security of 
southbound interface needs special attention as control 
transfers through this interface.To secure the SDN,the 
firewalls policies needs to be taken care of. 
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